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INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 1999, Nigeria inaugurated former General Olsegun
Obasanjo,' the first civilian head of State after fifteen years of mili-
tary rule.2 The elections marked the beginning of a series of demo-
cratic changes that swept the country.3 Many scholars hoped that
1. See Scott Powers, Wilberforce Will Honor Presidential Board Member,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 1999 at BI (noting that General Olsegun Obasanjo
ruled Nigeria as a military leader from 1976-79, and oversaw the country's transi-
tion to democracy, stepping down to an elected civilian leader).
2. See Nigerian Envoy Touts Election, NEW ORLEANS TIMES -PICAYUNE, Oct.
10, 1998, at Cl (noting that the elections were the first free elections held in nearly
thirty years); see also David Orr, Nigeria Moving to Civilian Rule, THE
SCOTSMAN, July 21, 1998, at 8 (reporting that General Sani Achaba annulled the
last presidential elections and subsequently jailed the presumed winner, Chief
Abiola); see also Karl Vick, Albright Hails Restoration of Democracy in Nigeria,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1999, at A21 (reporting past occurrences of democratic ini-
tiatives in Nigeria)
3. See Margaret Bald, Obasanjo Cleans House, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Aug.
1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19036300 (describing the democratic changes in-
stituted after Obasanjo's election). Shortly after taking office, Obasanjo committed
himself to increased dialogue with those in the Niger Delta and established a panel
to review human rights violations committed by his military predecessors. See id.
But see MOSOP Urges Caution Over "Democratic Progress ", AFRICA NEWS
SERV., Oct. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25951075 (reporting police had held
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these changes would serve as a model to the rest of Africa by en-
couraging economic development and democratic initiatives.'
As part of his commitment to democratic reform, President Oba-
sanjo offered the people in the oil-producing Niger Delta' a greater
share of the revenue derived from the region.' For years, government
officials mismanaged and misdirected government money at the ex-
pense of social services and economic development." Despite assur-
ances that this would change, however, government neglect and hu-
Jerry Needam, editor of the Ogoni Star, since October 11, 1999 without charge).
The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People ("MOSOP"), a Nigerian hu-
man rights and environmental group, also learned the Nigerian army is intending to
remove indigenes from the Delta, a move usually seen immediately prior to a
military crackdown. See id.
4. See Barbara Slavin, Three Hot Spots of the Nei Millennium, USA TODAY,
Nov. 1, 1999, at All (arguing that the events in Nigeria have international effects
in part because it is the largest oil producer and the most populous country in Af-
rica).
5. See generally Niger Delta Project Comes Under Fire, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Sept. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 27374168 (listing Rivers, Delta, and Bayelsa
States as the three core oil producing States). The surrounding States of Cross
River, Abia, Imo, Aklva Ibom, and Endo also contribute to the region's oil pro-
duction. See id.
6. See Nigeria: An Encouraging Start, BUSINESS AFRICA, June 16, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 2041358 (recounting President Obasanjo's early accom-
plishments in office and noting that he promised to increase the amount of oil
revenue returned to oil-producing States); see also NIG. CONST., ch. 6, pt. 1 sec. C
(requiring that the government return at least 13% of the oil revenue to the State
from which it is derived, an increase from the former three per cent constitutional
requirement).
7. See Today in the Nigeria Newspaper, AFRICA NEWS SERV., Oct. 21, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 25951337 (reporting Nigerian investigators are in negotia-
tions with the wife of former head of State General Sani Abacha to recover large
sums of money stashed in foreign banks); see also U.S. Leaders Write Albright on
Nigeria, AFRICA NEWS SERV., Oct. 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25950673 at
*1 (noting in a letter from the Leadership Commission on the Nigerian Transition
to Secretary of State Madeline Albright that "for over 40 years the oil companies
and successive military dictators have taken billions of dollars worth of oil annu-
ally from the Niger Delta and returned nothing to the local communities except
poverty, pollution, and repression").
8. See BRONWEN MANBY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL 95-96
(1999) (detailing the social and economic conditions in the oil producing regions).
Only 20-25 % of those in rural communities have access to safe drinking water,
less than 25 % have proper sanitation, and there is no city-wide sewage system in
the area's largest city of Port Harcourt. See id.
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man rights abuses initiated by the military9 continue to be a fixture in
the region.'°
For this reason, natives of the Delta complained" to both the Nige-
rian government and oil-producing companies about the
misallocation of resources and environmental destruction that has
occurred as a result of oil spills and flares. 2 The government and oil
producers, however, have responded unsympathetically to these
complaints.'3 In response, indigenous people have resorted to a vari-
ety of acts of sabotage.' 4 Recently, tensions escalated as the people in
the region grew increasingly frustrated and began kidnapping oil
company employees and holding them for ransom."
9. See infra notes 223-33 (discussing the government's response to the
Kaiama Declaration). See generally B. 0. NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA (1993) for a discussion of the effects of military rile
on social justice.
10. See MOSOP Urges Caution Over "Democratic Progress", supra note 3
(reporting that police and military personnel in the Niger Delta are continuing to
commit human rights abuses).
11. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 131-134 (providing examples of arbitrary de-
tentions and arrests when citizens have complained to government officials or
protested oil company activities). The primary goals of the indigenous people are
to receive a larger share of the profits derived from the region and to thereby exer-
cise control over the mineral resources in the region. See infra notes 204 and 217-
22 and accompanying text (discussing the provision in the Ogoni Bill of Rights
and the Kaiama Declaration demanding increased control over mineral resources).
Tribal leaders also seek compensation for the injuries oil production has caused to
both indigenous people and the environment. See id.
12. See Shell Oil, Information Resource (visited Mar. 3, 2000)
<http://www.shell.com/searchIbrowse/global/> (defining a gas flare as the release
of burning natural gas into the atmosphere during the process of collecting oil and
noting that efforts to collect flared gas will take years to develop at a substantial
cost).
13. See Norimitsu Onishi, Nigeria Combustible as South's Oil Enriches North,
N.Y. Times on the Web (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.com/search>
(quoting a Shell executive who stated that communities need development, but the
development needed is beyond the capacity of the oil industry and so the govern-
ment should take the lead).
14. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 82-87 (describing the sabotage methods em-
ployed and their cumulative effects). In 1997, Shell reported that almost 80 per
cent of the 80,412 barrels of oil spilled in the Niger Delta was the result of sabo-
tage. See id. at 82. In 1995, that figure was only 60 per cent. See id.
15. See U.S. Dept. of State, Nigeria - Travel Warning (last updated Apr. 29,
1999) <http://travel.state.gov/nigeria warning.html> (replacing the travel warning
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Consequently, oil company representatives complained to the gov-
emment, which relies heavily on oil production revenue." The gov-
ernment, in turn, responded traditionally by cracking down on citi-
zen's rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR" or "Covenant"),'" including the rights to
freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.'" The
government also violated rights relating to criminal procedures, in-
cluding the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and
the right to be informed of pending charges and trial without undue
delay.
20
The purpose of the ICCPR is to expand and clarify the United Na-
dated May 27, 1998 to note increases of kidnapping for ransom and warning that
this particularly applies to those associated with the petroleum sector in the south-
east region of the country); see also Onishi, supra note 13 (stating that members of
the Ijaw ethnic group cut Nigeria's oil production by a third by seizing approxi-
mately twenty oil stations owned by Shell and Chevron in the weeks prior to No-
vember 22, 1998).
16. See, e.g., John Darnton, Shell Makes a Big Oil Discover" Off Nigeria, N.Y.
TIMES, March 12, 1996, at A8 (reporting that at the request of Shell, the govern-
ment sent in military troops to battle sabotage attempts, resulting in the death of
two thousand people).
17. See International Monetary Fund, Nigeria: Selected Issues and Statistical
Appendix, Report No. 98/78 at 6-11 (Aug. 1998) (finding petroleum revenues and
expenditures account for 96 per cent of exports and comprises more than 40 per
cent of Nigeria's gross domestic product).
18. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on Mar.23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Nigeria, as a signatory to the Covenant, is obligated to guarantee the rights con-
tained in the Covenant; see also United Nations, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfilestpart _boo'iv booliv_4.html>
(noting Nigeria acceded to the Covenant on July 23, 1993) [hereinafter ICCPR
website].
19. See ICCPR supra note 18, at 178 (enumerating the rights to freedom of ex-
pression, association, and peaceful assembly); see also infra notes 223-33 and ac-
companying text (discussing the government's response to the Kaiama Declara-
tion).
20. See Nigerian Government Denies Holding Newspaper Editor, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25138002 (reporting that
police detained Jerry Needham, editor of the Ogoni Star, a newspaper which pro-
motes the interests of MOSOP, for approximately three weeks before releasing him
on bail).
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tions' ("U.N.") Human Rights Declaration2' and to give it the full
force of a treaty.22 Article IV of the ICCPR allows governments to
suspend enumerated rights only "in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed."23 The treaty fails, however, to define the meaning of
"public emergency." This has resulted in a situation whereby a sig-
natory's invocation of the ICCPR's Article IV exemption 4 is not al-
ways clearly warranted.25 As a result, government leaders from a va-
riety of countries have, arguably, abused the exemption and invoked
Article IV at times other than when the life of the nation has been
threatened.
2 6
This Comment argues that it is necessary to adopt uniform stan-
21. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217([11)(A), U.N.
GAOR 3d Sess., 183d Plen. Mtg., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
22. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 173 (drawing on provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to guarantee civil and political freedom and freedom
from fear and want). The authors of the treaty felt that the only way to ensure that
every citizen enjoyed the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration was to
guarantee civil and political rights. See id.
23. See infra note 24, at 174 (providing the full text of Art. IV).
24. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174. The entire article provides:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the pre-
sent Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18
may be made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of dero-
gations shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Cove-
nant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it
was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the same in-
termediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
25. See id. (limiting the extent of derogation measures rather than defining the
circumstances in which they are appropriate).
26. See International Commission of Jurists, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THEIR
IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS i (1983) (characterizing unjustified invocation of the
Article IV exemption as an unfortunate tendency).
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dards when applying Article IV. It uses the current political situation
in Nigeria to demonstrate both the need for such a test and the abuse
that results from the lack of uniform interpretive standards.2" Part I
considers the relevant provisions and guarantees of the ICCPR. It
then examines the views adopted by the Human Rights Committee,
the agency charged with monitoring and enforcing ICCPR provi-
sions. This section argues that the ICCPR's derogation provision is
unclear and in need of further interpretation to allow for government
confidence in invoking and defending derogation measures em-
ployed when faced with a public emergency.
Part II details the decisions of both the European Human Rights
Commission2 8 and the Court of Human Rights interpreting the pub-
lic emergency exemption of a treaty provision that closely resembles
the ICCPR's derogation provision. It then considers the Siracusa
Principles0 and the Paris Minimum Standards," which represent at-
tempts by the international community to identify circumstances in
which the invocation of the public emergency exemption is justified.
Part III examines the current political environment in Nigeria. It
details the close relationship between oil companies and the govern-
ment and the human rights violations that have occurred as a result of
that relationship, emphasizing acts that violate the ICCPR. It then
considers the Ogoni affair, the most successful series of protests re-
27. See generally Curfew Lifted in Nigeria s Troubled Region, PANAFRICAN
NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7543294 (noting the govern-
ment imposed a week-long state of emergency in response to the Kaiama Declara-
tion); see e.g., MANBY, supra note 8, at 187 (stating that the Nigerian government
has not made any formal attempts to invoke the Article IV exemption, but that at
least one human rights group has expressed concern that this may occur).
28. See infra note 95, 96 and accompanying text (arguing the European Human
Rights Commission's decisions have contributed to determining whether a deroga-
tion is legal).
29. See infra note 142 and accompanying text (arguing that the European Court
of Human Rights' methods for determining whether a derogation is legal is insight-
ful to an interpretation of the ICCPR).
30. See Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 1 (1985)
[hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
31. See The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of
Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072 (1985) [hereinafter Paris Minimum Stan-
dards].
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suiting in a prolonged disruption of oil production. This is followed
by an examination of the Kaiama Declaration,32 a statement issued by
a tribe in the Niger Delta expressing its determination to regain con-
trol of the region, by force if necessary.
Part IV applies the common ideology developed from the Euro-
pean interpretative bodies, the Siracusa Principles, and the Paris
Minimum Standards to the Nigerian situation, demonstrating the dif-
ficulty in determining whether invocation of Article IV is appropri-
ate. It then argues that an attempt by the Nigerian government to in-
voke the exception would not be legally justified.
Part V recommends a clear set of guidelines that should be
adopted by the Human Rights Committee to assist countries when
faced with an emergency in determining whether implementation of
Article IV is appropriate. It then suggests a methodology for moni-
toring derogations to ensure that the reach of the ICCPR is not vio-
lated and to hold States accountable for official acts taken during a
state of emergency. Finally, it recommends appropriate governmen-
tal measures designed to bring an effective resolution to the current
crisis facing the Delta region.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS
The ICCPR seeks to codify, and hold States obligated to, the prin-
ciples found in the United Nations Charter.33 The preamble indicates
that the rights found in the Covenant are legal rights rather than
moral principles.34 The ICCPR recognizes that civil and political
rights are derived from the inherent dignity of human beings." It is
32. See generally Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta, The Kaiama Declaration,
reprinted in Recent Documents in the Delta Region, AFRICA NEWS SERV., Dec. 30,
1998, available in 1998 WL 21358935 [hereinafter Kaiama Declaration].
33. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 171 (according the principles in the Covenant
to those in the Charter of the United Nations).
34. See Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1981) (asserting that the Covenant's provisions
are not merely moral postulates, but have an element of legal obligation).
35. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 172 (recognizing the inherent dignity and
equal and inalienable rights of all people).
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premised upon the concept that freedom from fear and want can only
be achieved by granting civil and political rights. '
The ICCPR guarantees certain rights, including self-
determination,3 7 non-discrimination under the law,3' freedom of
movement, 9 and the right to life.* Furthermore, it provides that no
one shall be subjected to torture,"' slavery,42 or arbitrary arrest."' The
Covenant obligates signatory States to guarantee these rights and any
others contained in the Covenant.i
Derogations45 from the Covenant's obligations are permissible un-
der Article IV." Section 1 allows States to derogate from treaty pro-
36. See id. at 173 (noting these ideals can be achieved if everyone enjoys civil
and political rights).
37. See id. (proclaiming the right to self-determination and creating the right to
determine one's own political status and the ability to freely pursue economic, so-
cial and cultural development).
38. See id. (imposing an obligation on States to respect the rights of the Cove-
nant "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status").
39. See id. at 176 (creating the freedom to choose one's own residence and to
leave any country, including one's own).
40. See id. at 174 (providing that no one shall be arbitrarily killed).
41. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 175 (listing the methods of torture as includ-
ing cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, particularly non-consensual medical or
scientific experimentation).
42. See id. at 175-76 (prohibiting slavery and slave-trade in all its forms).
43. See id. (ensuring the right to liberty and security of person and requiring
prompt notification of charges to anyone who is arrested).
44. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 77 (discussing the character of a State's ob-
ligations under the ICCPR). Article 11 (1) requires States "to respect" and "to en-
sure" the rights contained in the Covenant. See id. The respect prong requires only
that a State not violate the Covenant's provisions. See id. Ensuring these rights,
however, is a broader concept. It creates affirmative obligations to take all reason-
able measures to ensure individuals are able to enjoy these rights fully and freely,
including the removal of any conflicting national laws. See hi.
45. See HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
THESAURUS 44 (1988) (defining a derogation as a "suspension of certain guaran-
teed rights which are not 'nonstandsfest' during states of emergency").
46. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174 (stating the circumstances when a dero-
gation is appropriate). When such circumstances exist, States "'may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenants to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation provided such measures are not incon-
2000] 1171
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visions when confronted with public emergencies that threaten the
life of the nation.17 The purpose of this section is to ensure that coun-
tries are able to adequately protect themselves when faced with an
unforeseen crisis. 8 In times of public emergency, a State may dero-
gate from most of the Covenant's provisions, including freedom of
movement, peaceful assembly, and association. 9
The Covenant, however, does reserve particular rights as non-
derogable. ° These rights reflect both principles of international law
and notions that suspension of particular rights is never an adequate
response to a public emergency.5' Section 2 of Article IV prohibits
sistent with their obligations under international law .... See id. When taking
measures that constitute a derogation, States may not discriminate "solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." See id.
Derogation clauses generally reflect a tension between the desire to protect
human rights and the protection of national sovereignty. See Joan F. Hartman,
Derogations fiom Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies: A Critique o/
Inplementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1981)
[hereinafter Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Enter-
gencies]. When faced with a State that wishes to derogate, international bodies are
hesitant to enforce derogation provisions stringently. They do not want to appear
indifferent to legitimate State interests, and the causes of national crises are often
too complex for an outside body to fully understand. See id. There is a general fear
that if States do not feel that their concerns have been appropriately acknowledged,
they will lose respect for, and refuse to comply with, international law. See id. As a
result, attempts by the international community to ensure State concerns do not
dominate individual rights have been largely unsuccessful. See id.
47. See infra notes 100-137 and accompanying text (discussing how the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has interpreted a similar provision in the European
Convention).
48. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Enter-
gencies, supra note 46, at 2 (arguing derogation clauses reflect a compromise be-
tween protection of individual rights and national needs).
49. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 176, 178 (corresponding to Articles 12, 2 1,
and 22, respectively).
50. See id. at 174 (enumerating provisions exempted from Article IV (I)). The
Covenant, however, does not expressly state why these rights are non-derogable.
See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 83.
51. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 83 (presuming some rights, such as the right
to life, are too important to permit derogations). According to international law,
rights that have risen to the level of jus cogens may never be abridged. See id.
Derogations from other rights, such as the prohibition on imprisonment for non-
compliance with contractual obligations, would never be "strictly required" in a
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derogations from an individual's right to life, freedom from torture
and slavery, imprisonment for failure to fulfill a contractual obliga-
tion, and imprisonment for acts not previously legislated as a crime."
Individuals are also guaranteed the right to recognition as a person
before the law and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion."
The procedures for a legal derogation are contained in Section 3.
A primary purpose of this section is to require States to acknowledge
their use of derogating measures and to deter attempts to apply these
powers retroactively." It requires any State seeking to invoke Article
IV(l) to immediately notify other parties to the Covenant of the
derogation, and to inform them of the provisions to which the dero-
gation applies and the reasons for the measures employed.C ' The
derogating State is likewise required to inform the other parties of
when derogation measures are terminated.' To comply with the im-
mediate notification provision, notice of the derogation should be
sent to the U.N. Secretary-General simultaneously with the procla-
mation of a public emergency.5'
state of emergency. See id.
52. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174-75. 176, 177 (corresponding to Articles
VI, VII, VIII, IX, and XV, respectively).
53. See id. at 177-78 (corresponding to Articles XVI and XVIII, respectively).
54. See id. at 174 (mandating that a State, when invoking a state of emergency,
must inform the other parties of the provision to which the derogation applies and
provide reasons for its application). States are likewise required to notify involved
parties upon the termination of a state of emergency. See id.
55. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 18 (arguing the ICCPR's notice requirement serves to
control derogations).
56. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174 (establishing derogation notification pro-
cedures).
57. See id. (requiring States to notify other parties of the termination of dero-
gation measures).
58. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 84 (stating that the treaty language was in-
tended to circumvent longer delays permissible under similar treaties). The notice
requirement is an attempt to control derogations. See Hartman, Derogations from
Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, supra note 46, at 18. Requiring a
State to make immediate notification, for example, deters States from attempting to
make a retroactive claim to justify previous repressive action. See id. It is also rea-
sonable to expect a State to hesitate more when it is naming the fights it is sus-
pending than when simply applying legislative and executive measures. See id. at
20.
2000] 173
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Acceptable derogation measures include, for instance, prolonging
detention without a trial and banning political organizations. " A key
weakness of Article IV(3), however, is that it fails to require States to
report the specific derogation measures takeni ° The international
community is not cognizant of the extent derogation measures were
utilized or how many people were affected unless an enforcement
action is taken.' The failure to impose such a requirement has made
it difficult to decipher whether actions taken in derogation were
"strictly necessary," as required by Section 1.62
B. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND ARTICLE IV
Part IV of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee
("Committee" or "HRC") and charges it with monitoring State com-
pliance with the provisions of the Covenant. 6' Article XL requires
States to submit reports to the Committee, detailing measures it has
adopted to ensure recognition of treaty rights.64 Additionally, Article
XL requires that States report on the progress achieved in granting
those rights.65 This includes any factors or difficulties the State expe-
rienced in implementing any portion of the Covenant.66 Each State is
required to submit such a report one year after committing to the ob-
59. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174 (permitting derogation measures strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation giving rise to the state of emergency).
60. See generally HENKIN, supra note 34, at 85 (proposing that the article, read
as a whole, suggests that a State must provide information regarding the measures
it proposes to take, notwithstanding the absence of specific language to that end);
see also Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergen-
cies, supra note 46, at 21 (noting the absence of an automatic review process in the
ICCPR and characterizing it as a "serious deficiency").
61. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Ener-
gencies, supra note 46, at 20-21 (enumerating the possible shortcomings of this
omission).
62. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 85 (proposing derogating measures be
stipulated so that they may be scrutinized by international bodies).
63. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 179-84 (establishing the Human Rights
Committee, providing for the election of its members, and enumerating its respon-
sibilities).
64. See id. at 181 (imposing on State parties the obligation to submit reports).
65. See id. (providing the general content of the reports).
66. See id. at 181 (requiring States to include factors and difficulties affecting
the implementation of the covenant in their reports).
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ligations of the treaty and thereafter as requested by the HRC."
The Committee is responsible for examining the contents of the
report and offering general commentary." Although not required by
the terms of the Covenant, in practice, States have sent representa-
tives to the Committee's hearings when its report is under considera-
tion.69 This practice has allowed Committee members to question the
representative on the contents of the report, including any missing,
inadequate, or contradictory information.7" The Committee has, how-
ever, maintained a policy of not criticizing States for their failure to
fully implement the provisions of the treaty.7'
Under Article XL(3) of the Covenant, the HRC has the authority
to transmit its reports and general comments to State parties." After
intense debate over whether these general comments should be di-
rected at an individual State report, the Committee decided to use
general comments to address all State reports comprehensively rather
67. See id. at 182 (imposing a duty on the Committee to study a State's report).
The duty to "study" rather than "monitor," "enforce," or "ensure" is indicative of a
trade off-strong human rights treaties accompanied by weak enforcement bodies.
See Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Comnittee: An Argument
forDemarginalizing Enforcentent, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 211, 214-16 (1998).
68. See id. (permitting the Human Rights Committee ("HRC") to make general
comments as it deems appropriate).
69. See Dana Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 169 (Hurst Hannum, ed. 1984) (noting
the HRC adopted the practice of allowing a representative to present the State re-
port and permitting the representative to answer questions from the Committee).
70. See DOMINIc MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 78 (1991) (reporting members of the HRC have generally accepted that the
ICCPR does not prohibit the use of outside sources in the consideration of State
reports). Committee members generally do not disclose the source of this addi-
tional information. See id.
71. See wa Mutua, supra note 67, at 227 (noting the HRC utilitizes methods
aimed at encouraging and persuading States to honor their obligations rather than
harassing or ridiculing States into compliance). The Committee did, however, de-
viate from this practice when considering Iraq's report shortly after the Gulf War.
See Report of the Human Rights Comnmittee, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 157-58, U.N. Doe. A/46/40 (1991) (evaluating Iraq's third periodic report).
72. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 181 (authorizing the release of State reports
to State parties).
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than a single State report. 73 The intent of the general comments is to
promote interstate cooperation in the implementation of the Cove-
nant's provisions, to summarize the activities of the HCR in its con-
sideration of State reports, and to urge the improvement of State re-
porting.
74
Recently, the scope of these comments expanded to include the
explication of individual State's interpretation of the treaty's provi-
sions. Whereas previous general comments only repeated the provi-
sions of the ICCPR and were, therefore, of little use in guiding State
practice, since 1992, general comments have been increasingly use-
ful to States 6
The HRC issued its only general comment on Article IV in 1981.
77
It began by recognizing the provision posed problems in the consid-
eration of State reports. 78 The HRC summarized the contents of the
derogation provision and examined State reports that indicated the
mechanisms employed in declaring a public emergency as well as the
respective governing laws. 9 In determining its view of Article IV
measures, the Committee pronounced that any derogation measures
taken must be exceptional and temporary, and may last only for as
73. See Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 408-09 (Philip Alston, ed. 1992)
(reporting on the divergent viewpoints of the Committee members on the use of
general comments). Since 1992, the Committee has included collective comments
at the end of each State report. See wa Mutua, supra note 67, at 225. These com-
ments specifically address the State report and make recommendations. See id.
74. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex IV, at 101, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (expressing the Commis-
sion's intended use of general comments to define obligations under Article XL).
75. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex V, at 93-96, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (addressing the right
to life and right to personal security).
76. See wu Mutua, supra note 67, at 231 (noting that the higher quality of gen-
eral comments has been increasingly useful to States seeking better guidelines tin-
der the ICCPR).
77. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex VII, General Comment 5/13, at 110, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981)
(analyzing the Committee's position on Article IV derogation measures).
78. See id. (noting Article IV measures posed problems for the Committee).
79. See id. (reporting that States have informed the Committee on the mecha-
nisms for declaring a state of emergency).
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long as the life of the nation is threatened.' It then expressed that in
cases of derogation, the protection of human rights is particularly
important.8' The Committee emphasized the importance of the notifi-
cation requirement as well as the inclusion of the nature and extent of
each right from which the State has derogated in its report. 2 The
Committee did not, however, express a view on the circumstances
that would justify invoking such measures.
II. DETERMINING WHETHER A PUBLIC
EMERGENCY EXISTS
Meaningful interpretations of Article IV provision are limited.'
Examination of various sources and the standards defined by the in-
ternational community attempting to interpret derogation provisions,
however, reveals a general consensus on whether, and under what
circumstances, a State may derogate from treaty obligations when
faced with a public emergency.8" Applying the common standards
and principles that have emerged from different approaches to dero-
gation provisions clarifies the circumstances in which an Article IV
80. See id. (noting that derogation measures should only occur in extraordinary
circumstances and be of temporary duration).
81. See id. (expressing particular concern for citizen's rights during a state of
emergency, particularly so for core human rights).
82. See Report of the Human Rights Comminee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex VII, General Comment 5/13, at 110, U.N. Doc. AJ36/40 (1981)
(setting forth the notification and reporting requirements of the provision).
83. See id. (emphasizing the nature of derogation measures permissible under
the provision rather than the circumstances which may give rise to those meas-
ures).
84. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY, at i
(stating many governments regard any challenge to their authority as a threat to
national security and invoke Article IV exceptions, leaving Article IV open to
abuse). The Human Rights Committee has little authority under Article XL to de-
termine standards for derogations or to ensure compliance with Article IV. See
generally ICCPR, supra note 18, at 181-82 (endowing the Human Rights Com-
mittee with the responsibility to receive and study reports submitted by derogating
States).
85. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Eter-
gencies, supra note 46, at 16-18 (discussing the essential criteria for a legitimate
derogation under the ICCPR and the European Convention).
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• 86derogation is appropriate.
A. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION
Both the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention")8 7 and the
ICCPR are rooted in the U.N. Charter and Declaration of Human
Rights.88 Both recognize the importance of granting political rights as
a means of establishing freedom and justice in the world.8 9 Each
treaty guarantees essentially identical rights," and the derogation ar-
ticles of the European Convention and the ICCPR are similar.9' Arti-
86. See generally infra notes 234-79 and accompanying text (arguing that when
the standards for derogation articulated in international agreements are applied to
the current political situation in Nigeria, the derogation measures implemented be-
come legally unjustifiable).
87. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
88. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 173 (incorporating the ideal of freedom in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the obligations of the United Nations
Charter into the agreement); see also European Convention, supra note 87, at 222-
24 (attempting to establish among the European nations collective enforcement of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
89. See ICCPR, supra note 18 (noting the ideal that freedom can only be
achieved if everyone can enjoy his or her civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights); see also European Convention, supra note 87, at 222 (maintaining
that the foundation of peace and justice is an effective political democracy that
preserves human rights).
90. Compare ICCPR, supra note 18, at 171, with European Convention, supra
note 87, at 221 (guaranteeing almost identical civil and political rights).
91. Compare ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174, with European Convention supra
note 87, at 232-234 (allowing derogation in times of public emergency). The full
text of the European Convention's derogation provision reads:
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obliga-
tions under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
(2) No derogations from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from articles 3 [prohibition against torture], 4 (para-
graph 1) [prohibition against slavery] and 7 [prohibition against being con-
victed of a crime which did not constitute a crime at the time the act occurred]
shall be made under this provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall
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cle 15 of the European Convention allows signatories to derogate "in
time of war or other public emergency that threatens the life of a na-
tion."92 Like the ICCPR, Article 15 also enumerates rights that may
not be derogated. 93 The ICCPR, however, expands the list of non-
derogable rights.9
Section II of the European Convention establishes a permanent
Court of Human Rights to ensure signatories guarantee the rights
contained in the European Covenant.9" Given the similarities between
the two treaties, the Court's interpretation of the relevant article of
the European Convention serves as a useful guide to the determina-
tion of the ICCPR's conception of a national emergency.' The fol-
lowing instances of the Court's interpretation of the European Con-
vention provide insight for a legally recognized methodology to
bring clarity to the ICCPR.97 Furthermore, the actions taken by the
European Commission are demonstrative of a determination regard-
keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the
measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased
to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully en-
forced.
European Convention, supra note 87, at 232-34.
92. Id.
93. See id. (listing non-derogable rights).
94. See, ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174 (including prohibition against impris-
onment for failing to fulfill contractual obligations, revocation of recognition be-
fore the law, and interference with freedom of thought, conscience, and religion).
95. See European Convention, supra note 87, at 234 (establishing that the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
("Court") ensure observance of the provisions of the European Convention). The
Court has considered Article 15 derogation challenges four times since its estab-
lishment. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 23.
96. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 78, citing ROSALYN HIGGINS, Derogations
Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 286-88 (1976-77) (ar-
guing that due to the similarities between the derogation clauses, the interpretations
given to the European Covenant by the European Commission and Court of Hu-
man Rights provides a useful jurisprudence for interpreting Article IV of the
ICCPR).
97. See generally supra notes 99-137 and accompanying text (discussing the
interpretation of the European Covenant's derogation provision and arguing it is
applicable to the ICCPR's derogation provision).
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ing the relevant circumstances constituting a state of emergency."
1. The Lawless Case
In Lawless v. Republic of Ireland ("The Lawless Case")," the
European Commission ("Commission") had the opportunity to inter-
pret the Article 15 derogation provision.'O The Commission's report
came in 1960, just seven years after the Convention took effect.""
The case involved the five-month detention of a twenty-two year-old
Irish national for suspicion of being a member of the Irish Republi-
can Army ("IRA"). °2 Authorities detained him without charge or
trial in an internment camp pursuant to an Order °3 issued by the
Minister of Justice.'4 By a vote of 9-5, the Commission determined a
state of emergency existed in Ireland at the time the Convention's
provisions were violated and the derogation measures were therefore
justified.' 05
The Commission used the opportunity to define the standard of re-
view it would apply when considering instances of derogation under
the European Convention.'10 It held that in determining whether a
state of emergency existed, a "public emergency threatening the life
98. See generally id. and accompanying text (discussing the relevant cases to
the interpretation of the European Convention and applying it to the ICCPR).
99. The Lawless Case, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 9 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), a/d
1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 438 (Eur. Ct. on H.R.).
100. See European Convention, supra note 87, at 234-42 (establishing the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights to ensure observance of the provisions of the
European Convention).
101. See id. at 222 (entering into force Sept. 3, 1953).
102. See generally The Lawless Case, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 17-22 (providing
a detailed account of the facts).
103. See id. at 18, citing Offenses Against the State Act, 1939 (Ireland) (setting
out the relevant provisions of the Act).
104. See id. (providing the legal basis for the government's action). Lawless
claimed such a detention violated his right to liberty and security of person and the
right to a speedy trial. See id.
105. See id. at 56, 183 (summarizing the issues and holding of the court).
106. See Hartman, Derogations fiom Human Rights Treaties in Public Emner-
gencies, supra note 46, at 24 (indicating that The Lawless Case was the Commis-
sion's first public discussion of standards of review under Article 15 of the Euro-
pean Convention).
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of a nation"'' 7 should be considered in its "natural and ordinary
meaning."' ' Applying this standard, the Commission determined that
a state of emergency is an exceptional and imminent crisis affecting
the general public, as opposed to particular groups, which threatens
the organized life of the community.'"9
The Commission further noted that when making this determina-
tion, the government declaring the state of emergency deserves a
margin of appreciation."0 Ultimately, the Commission concluded that
the IRA's existence as an illegal organization dedicated to the use of
violence and the threat the IRA posed to the Republic of Ireland jus-
tified the government's derogation claim."'
Citing the existence of the IRA, the threat to foreign relations, and
an increase in terrorist activities, the European Court of Human
Rights ("Court") similarly determined the Irish government was jus-
tified in invoking derogation measures."2 It agreed with the Commis-
sion's determinations that Article 15 of the European Convention
should be interpreted in light of its natural and customary meaning,"'
and that the entire population and organized life of the community
must be threatened to establish such an emergency."" The Court did
107. The Lawless Case, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 82.
108. Id.
109. See id. (defining further the "natural and ordinary meaning" of "a public
emergency threatening the life of a nation").
110. See id. (finding that while the concept of a public emergency in its "natural
and ordinary meaning" is clear, it is difficult to determine whether a situation falls
into the public emergency definition, and therefore a certain level of discretion
should be left to the government declaring the emergency).
111. See id. at 83-90 (examining each claim in detail and determining a state of
emergency existed). But see id. at 90 (Mr. Eusthahiades, dissenting) (emphasizing
the requirement that a national emergency affect the entire population of a nation
rather than one segment of the nation's population).
112. See The Lawless Case, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Cony. On H.R. at 470-74 (Eur. Ct.
on H.R.) (determining the existence of a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation).
113. See id. at 474 (referencing the European Commission's conception of
"public emergency").
114. See id. at 470-74 (finding that "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation" refers to situations that affect the whole population and threaten the or-
ganized life of the community).
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not determine, however, the amount of deference it would grant to a
State's national emergency determination."'
The result of The Lawless Case, therefore, defined an Article 15
state of emergency as an exceptional situation that affects the entire
population and threatens the nation's organized life."' The amount of
deference that should be granted to a State government declaring a
state of emergency, however, was left in doubt."'
2. The Greek Case
In 1967, the Greek military replaced the existing government, de-
clared martial law, suspended several articles of the Greek Constitu-
tion, and imprisoned opposition leaders."' The military then declared
a state of emergency, claiming it could derogate from its obligations
under the European Convention." 9 In The Greek Case,2 the Com-
mission constructed a precise definition of a public emergency."'1 It
defined four criteria that a government invoking the exception must
meet in order to conclude that a state of emergency exists: (1) the
emergency must be actual or imminent;' (2) its effects must involve
115. See id. at 54-62 (omitting discussion of the deference States should be af-
forded in declaring a state of emergency).
116. See generally supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text (examining the
facts and holding of The Lawless Case).
117. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the margin of ap-
preciation).
118. See H. PETZOLD, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, CASES AND MATERIALS: A READER FOR STUDENTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS pt. XIV-1, at I (3d ed., International
Institute of Human Rights 1979) (detailing the facts of The Greek Case).
119. See id. at 1 (stating Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and The Netherlands
brought complaints before the European Commission claiming Greece violated its
Convention obligations).
120. See id. at 8 (enumerating the characteristics of a state of emergency); see
also Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Coy. H.R. 1, 186 (1969) (Commission Report).
121. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Ener-
gencies, supra note 46, at 27 (maintaining the significance of The Greek Case be-
cause it defined a public emergency precisely and stringently).
122. See generally Daniel O'Donnell, Commentary on the Rapporteur on Dero-
gation, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 23, at 24 (noting that it is not permissible to use a state of
emergency declaration as a preventative measure).
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the nation as a whole rather than a segment of it;'2' (3) the emergency
must threaten the organized life of the community;'' and (4) it must
be exceptional, so that measures and restrictions permitted by the
European Convention are inadequate.' The Commission made only
slight mention of the margin of appreciation, indicating its signifi-
cance in the determination of a state of emergency was minimal. ' 2'
The Commission then applied the four criteria to each of the three
elements cited by the Greek military government to justify invoking
Article 15. These elements were: (1) the communist threat; (2) the
constitutional government crisis; and (3) the threat to public order.27
The Commission determined that anxiety about the government's
future stability did not constitute such a threat, even if that anxiety
was widespread.'2 The Commission then found there was no actual
or imminent emergency threatening the country."
3. Ireland v. United Kingdom
In Ireland v. United Kingdom," the European Commission and
Court again considered the margin of appreciation previously con-
123. But cf Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Louis Henkin, ed. 198 1) (stating that
a "public emergency threatening the life of a nation" could exist in a limited geo-
graphic location within a nation).
124. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 122, at 24 (asserting that in order to
qualify as a threat to the life of a nation, the threat must adversely affect the basic
functioning of indispensable institutions and not just any public institution).
125. See Buergenthal, supra note 123, at 79-80, (explaining that in The Greek
Case the European Commission identified four characteristics of a public emer-
gency that qualify as a threat to the life of a nation).
126. See Hartman, Derogations front Human Rights Treaties in Public Enter-
gencies, supra note 46, at 27 (stating that the Commission weighed the conflicting
evidence before it with little regard for the Greek military government's outlook).
127. See id. (discussing the Commission's observation that the communists were
arrested quickly and efficiently and therefore were not really a threat).
128. See id. (commenting on the Commission's determination that th Greek
population's concerns about its government's future did not amount to a constitu-
tional crisis).
129. See id. at 28 (noting the Commission's conclusion that normal measures
could control the situation in Greece).
130. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 23 (1976).
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sidered in The Lawless Case.' The case involved a 1976 challenge
by Ireland to the methods used by the authorities in Northern Ireland
to respond to the criminal activities of the IRA.' In this case, both
Ireland and the United Kingdom agreed a state of emergency existed
as a result of increasing violence in Northern Ireland."' As a result,
neither the Commission nor the Court performed an independent ex-
amination of whether a state of emergency actually existed,"14 indi-
cating it granted a great deal of deference to a State's determination
of the existence of a national emergency."'
4. A Refined Definition
The result of these cases indicates that when the legitimacy of a
derogation to Article 15 of the European Convention is questioned,
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights will apply the
four criteria enumerated in The Greek Case.'3 The level of deference
given to a government in declaring a public emergency, formerly left
open in The Lawless Case, has shifted from a minimal level in The
Greek Case, to a much higher level as a result of Ireland v. United
Kingdom.
37
Although the European Convention and the decisions of the Euro-
131. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 34 (claiming the European Court made its most extreme
statement on Article 15's "margin of appreciation" in Ireland v. United Kingdom).
132. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 398-400 (1976)
(setting forth introductory observations of the techniques used by authorities in
Northern Ireland). These methods include "hooding, wall-standing, noise, [and]
deprivation of food, water, and sleep." See id.
133. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 32 (noting that the issue in Ireland v. United Kingdom
was not the existence of an emergency, but the necessity of taking emergency
measures in response).
134. See id. (stating that the European Court found States were in a better posi-
tion to choose the remedies to resolve an emergency).
135. See id. at 27-28 (noting the European Court accorded a great deal of defer-
ence to States in determining whether a state of emergency existed).
136. See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text (discussing the applicable
criteria arising from The Greek Case).
137. See supra notes 110 and 135 and accompanying text (discussing the margin
of appreciation granted in The Lawless Case and Ireland v. United Kingdom, re-
spectively).
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pean Court and Commission are not binding on non-signatory
States, 38 their determinations should be granted deference. The
ICCPR and the European Convention share a common origin,lV and
the principles each seek to uphold are nearly identical.1E Further-
more, the textual language of the derogation provisions is similar,"'
and the European Convention's interpretive body's tendency to ex-
amine Article 15's derogation provisions in its natural and common
meaning make their findings easily transferable and applicable to the
ICCPR.
142
B. STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES PROPOSED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
There have been several attempts by leaders in the international
community to interpret the derogation provision of the ICCPR."'4
Such efforts have culminated in the development of principles and
standards that are a relevant guide to determining whether a deroga-
tion is legal.' 4
International customary law recognizes the work of legal scholars
and authors when determining whether an international norm ex-
ists.1' The lack of interpretation of Article IV by the Human Rights
138. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened fbr signature May
23, 1969, art. 26, 20.4.5(a)(i), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (stating treaties are binding
only on the parties to it and obligations must be carried out in good faith).
139. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing both treaties' roots in
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
140. See ICCPR, supra note 18; European Convention, supra note 87 (providing
the full citation to each of the documents).
141. See supra notes 24 and 91 (providing the text of each provision).
142. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 78 (arguing that the interpretation of Article
15 of the European Convention by both the European Human Rights Commission
and the European Court is a useful guide to interpreting the ICCPR's derogation
clause).
143. See e.g., HENKIN, supra note 34, at 126 (drawing on other sources to de-
velop an interpretation of the ICCPR's derogation clause).
144. See infra notes 151-70 (discussing the Siracusa Principles and Paris Mini-
mum Standards).
145. See BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-67 (As-
pen Law & Business 3d ed. 1999) (discussing the role of scholarly writings in the
development of international law).
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Committee 46 makes turning to outside interpretive bodies both nec-
essary and relevant. 47 Until the Human Rights Committee establishes
clear, enforceable guidelines, the international community has few
other sources to turn to for direction. 4 1 Consequently, as long as the
following principles and standards are consistent with international
law, they provide a useful guide to establish a framework for identi-
fying circumstances that constitute a state of emergency.' 49 The
Siracusa Principles and the Paris Minimum Standards are two
sources consistent with international law that provide insight into
when Article IV measures are appropriate. 5 0
1. The Siracusa Principles
In 1984, thirty-one international law experts from seventeen
countries met in Siracusa, Italy, to consider the ICCPR's limitation
and derogation provisions."' The Siracusa Principles on the Limita-
tion and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles" or "Principles")'52
reflect a need for the examination of particular circumstances war-
146. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 179-84 (creating the Human Rights Com-
mittee and defining its responsibilities).
147. See generally Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public
Emergencies, supra note 46, at 29-30 (noting the Human Rights Committee's dif-
ficulty in implementing Article IV).
148. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (noting the HRC has not
adopted uniform guidelines for the application of Article IV).
149. See infra note 154, 168 and accompanying text (determining that each work
is consistent with the rules of international law).
150. See id. (noting that both of these works are consistent with international
law); see also Paris Minimum Standards, supra note 31, at 1073 (providing that the
Standards may assist governments, international monitoring bodies, and nongov-
emnment organizations in determining the nature of a State's obligations when
faced with a public emergency).
151. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 30, Introduction (providing general in-
formation about the participants to the conference). The International Commission
of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, the American Association
for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human
Rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Studies con-
vened the experts. See id.
152. Siracusa Principles, supra note 30.
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ranting a derogation to effectively implement the rule of law."' The
Principles are consistent with the rules of international law.''
Part II of the Principles deals exclusively with derogations during
a public emergency.' The Principles characterize a public emer-
gency as a threat to the life of a nation that is 1) actual or imminent;
2) affects an entire population and some part of its territory; and 3)
affects a populations' physical integrity,'' political independence or
territorial integrity,'57 or the existence or function of indispensable in-
stitutions' designed to protect human rights.' The Principles spe-
cifically note that internal conflict and unrest do not satisfy these
conditions and that economic difficulties are not a per se justification
for invoking Article IV of the ICCPR.' ' In determining whether
these criteria are met, the Principles grant no margin of appreciation
to the government seeking to invoke derogation measures.
This conception reflects the belief that Article IV should only be
used in response to extreme measures rather than addressing chronic
153. See id. (noting a consensus among participants). In examining derogations,
the conference participants recognized a need to identify legitimate objectives,
general principles of interpretation, and main features of a derogation. See hi. at 1.
154. See id., at 2 (noting the Principles are consistent with the current state of
international law).
155. See generally id., at 7-14 (developing principles applicable to Article IV of
the ICCPR).
156. See generally JEAN-BERNARD MARIE, GLOSSARY OF HUMAN RIGHlTS:
BASIC TERMS IN UNIVERSAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENrs 254 (Editions de la
Maison des sciences de l'homme 1981) (defining integrity as the fight to have
one's physical, mental and moral integrity respected).
157. See id.
158. See O'Donnell, supra note 122, at 23-25 (discussing the particular language
employed and noting its significance). The drafters substituted language referenc-
ing the concept of the organized life of the community with a reference to indis-
pensable institutions. The substitution emphasizes that derogations may only be
used to protect human rights and may not be used for other means. See id.
159. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 30, at 7-8 (defining a public emergency
that threatens the life of a nation).
160. See id. at 8 (providing examples of circumstances that fail to meet the crite-
ria necessary for a public emergency declaration under the Siracusa Principles).
161. See O'Donnell, supra note 122, at 29 (determining that a good faith re-
quirement applies, but rejecting the margin of appreciation).
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tensions."2 As a way of further restricting unjustified governmental
action, the emergency must threaten the nation as a whole, affect its
ability to function, 63 and the threat must be actual or imminent rather
than speculative.'T 4 As a result, derogations are only permitted when
they are used to protect democratic institutions and aim to restore
their full operation. 6'
2. Paris Minimum Standards
In 1985, The Sixty-first Conference of the International Law As-
sociation adopted a set of minimum standards that should govern the
declaration and administration of a state of emergency.'66 The Paris
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms In a State of Emer-
gency are intended to ensure that even when a government declares a
bona fide declaration of a state of emergency, the basic human rights
guaranteed under Article IV will continue to be observed and re-
spected. 67 The International Law Association hoped the standards
would serve as a guide to both governments and non-governmental
168
organizations when a nation is seized by a state of emergency.
The document defines a public emergency as "an exceptional
situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent, which affects
162. See Joan F. Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the
Article 4 Derogation Provision, 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 89, 91 (1985) [hereinafter 1lart-
man, Working Paper] (emphasizing that Article IV should only be used in extreme
circumstances and not as a matter of habit).
163. See id. (stressing that the emergency must imperil the nation as a whole and
its ability to function as a democratic polity).
164. See id. (underscoring the need that the threat not be speculative, potential,
latent or lingering).
165. See id. at 90, citing Nicole Questiaux, Special Rapporteur, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection Qf Minorities: "Study
of the hnplications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situa-
tions Known as a State of Siege or Emergency," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15
(July 27, 1982) (concluding the circumstances for a legal derogation from the
ICCPR are extremely limited).
166. Paris Minimum Standards, supra note 31.
167. See id. (attempting to ensure human rights remain respected even in a state
of emergency).
168. See id. at 1073 (expressing the hope that those concerned with the meaning,
scope and effect of treaty obligations will find the Paris Standards of considerable
help).
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the whole population or the whole population of an area to which the
declaration applies and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the
community of which the State is composed."'" It specifically allows
derogation from human rights obligations, but excepts those rights
enumerated in international treaties as "nonsuspendable."'"'
C. A COMMON INTERPRETATION
The European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the
Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards share three
common criteria for determining whether a state of emergency ex-
ists.' First, the emergency must be an extreme circumstance that is
actual or imminent, as opposed to threatened, perceived, or persis-
tent.'2 The emergency must threaten the organized life of the com-
munity.' 73 Finally, the emergency must affect the entire population of
the country or the entire population in the area in which the derogat-
ing measures apply.'74
III. CASE STUDY: SHOULD NIGERIA INVOKE THE
ARTICLE IV DEROGATION PROVISION?
Although the Nigerian government has not formally sought to in-
voke the Article IV exception, it has warned it would declare a state
of emergency in any part of the country where violence breaks out.'"
169. See id. (establishing a working definition of a state of emergency).
170. See id. at 1074 (prohibiting derogations from internationally prescribed
rights). The document delineates which rights and freedoms are non-derogable, in-
cluding the right to legal personality, freedom from servitude and slavery, the right
to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and
freedom from imprisonment for the inability to fulfill a contractual obligation. See
id.
171. See generally infra notes 172-74 (establishing the requirements for a legal
derogation).
172. See supra notes 122, 159, 169 and accompanying text (establishing this as a
requirement for a legal derogation).
173. See supra notes 124, 159, 169 and accompanying text (establishing this as a
requirement for a legal derogation).
174. See supra notes 123, 159, 169and accompanying text (establishing this as a
requirement for a legal derogation).
175. See Paul Ejime, Vice-President Warns Nigerians to Stop 1iolence, AFRICA
NEvS SERV., Nov. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25954413 (reporting that the
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On December 30, 1998, for example, the government declared a state
of emergency in the Delta in response to threats of violence and in-
terference with oil production.1 6 Subsequent states of emergency in
the Delta have been proclaimed or threatened as a result of ethnic
tensions. '7' These actions have led at least one human rights organi-
zation to speculate that the Nigerian government may attempt to ar-
gue that protest and interference with oil production threatens na-
tional security.' 8 Examination of the political situation in the Delta,
however, reveals that such an argument would be legally unjusti-
fied.'
79
A. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL INDUSTRY
The Nigerian government, owner of all mineral resources in the
country, is responsible for negotiating production terms" ° with mul-
Nigerian government warned it would declare a state of emergency in any area
where violence exists); see also Cameron Duodu, Confounding the Prophets of
Doom, WORLD TODAY, Feb. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12485388 (character-
izing the government's habit of sending troops to enforce strict states of emergency
in response to protests against oil companies as a "knee jerk reaction").
176. See Cuifew Imposed on Troubled Nigerian State, AFRICA NEWS SERV.,
July 17, 1999, available in 1998 WL 21358835 (reporting the imposition of a state
of emergency in the Delta region following protests associated with the Kaiama
Declaration).
177. See generally Okafor Ofiebor, State of Emergency Declared in Warri,
AFRICA NEWS SERV., June 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 19530037 (noting the
government declared a state of emergency in response to ethnic rivalries and that
soldiers were authorized to shoot on sight anyone violating the curfew that was
imposed); see also Nigeria Exports Face New Threat, THE OIL DAILY, Nov. 19,
1999, available in 1999 WL 10015531 (reporting that growing anarchy and an in-
crease in ethnic clashes, attacks on oil companies, and demands for money led
President Obasanjo to consider imposing a state of emergency); see e.g., Update of
Events in West Africa, AFRICA NEWS SERV., Feb. 2, 2000, available in 2000 WL
12887635 (reporting that President Obasanjo threatened to declare a state of emer-
gency in one of the states in the Delta region if officials did not stop the threats to
security).
178. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 187 (noting that the Nigerian government may
argue that protests in the areas around oil installations pose a threat to national se-
curity).
179. See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text (applying the criteria for the
invocation of the Article IV exception and arguing the circumstances in Nigeria
fail to satisfy such criteria).
180. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 26-27 (stating that because Nigeria lacks suf-
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tinational oil companies. ' A series of ordinances in the 1960's
forced all companies operating in Nigeria to become Nigerian corpo-
rations 2 and steadily increased government control of the oil indus-
try. Throughout the 1970's, the government partially took control
over the industry's' and by 1979, it owned at least a 55 per cent stake
in each oil company operating within its borders.'"
Disagreements over government funding of the joint ventures
dominated exploration and production concerns throughout the
1990s. 8 6 The government has failed to provide oil companies with
both the funding it has requested and the funding it has promised.",'
ficient expertise to develop its oil reserves, the government must negotiate with
international oil companies on the country's behalf).
181. See id. (placing the responsibility of managing government-owned re-
sources in the National Assembly).
182. See id. at 27 (referencing the 1968 Companies Decree).
183. See id. (citing the 1969 Petroleum Decree, which formed the basis for the
regulatory system currently in effect).
184. See id. at 27-28 (stating that the government took an equity stake in the oil
industry). In 1971, the government's participation was 35 per cent. Three years
later, that figure rose to 55 per cent). See id.
185. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 28-29 (detailing the stake that the government
has in each oil company). There are currently six multinational oil companies op-
erating in Nigeria under these joint ventures: 1) Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria Limited ("SPDC") is owned by the Nigerian National Petro-
leum Corporation ('"NNPC") (55%), Shell (30%), Elf (10%), and Agip (5%). See
id. The joint venture accounts for approximately 40 % of total Nigerian oil pro-
duction; 2) Chevron Nigeria Limited ("CNL") is owned by the NNPC (60%) and
Chevron (40%). See id. CNL is expected to increase its oil production by 200,000
bpd; 3) Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited ("MPNU") is owned by the NNPC
(60%) and Mobil (40%). See id. Mobil is expected to increase its total production
to 900,000 within the next five years, thereby replacing Shell as the largest oil pro-
ducer in the country; 4) Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited ("NAOC") is owned
by the NNPC (60%), Agip (20%), and Phillips Petroleum (20%). See id. at 29-30.
Its current production is approximately 150,000 bpd; 5) Elf Petroleum Nigeria
Limted ("EPNL") is owned by the NNPC (60%) and Elf (40%) and produces ap-
proximately 125,000 bpd; 6) Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria
Unlimited ("TOPCON") is owned by the NNPC (60%), Texaco (20%) and Chev-
ron (20%) and currently produces 60,000 bpd. See id. at 30. Currently, the six for-
eign owned corporations operating joint ventures with the government mine ap-
proximately 2,730,000 barrels of oil per day ("bpd"). See id.
186. See id. at 31 (claiming exploration and other investment has been reduced
as a result of below-budgeted funding levels).
187. See id. (reporting that oil companies considered borrowing on international
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Because the government has not applied these cuts uniformly, how-
ever, companies have fought one another for limited resources. "' In
attempts to receive essential government funding, oil companies in-
creased their attempts to curry favor with government officials. '" As
a result, the government has been able to protect its interest in the oil
industry'90 and has avoided the crippling effects of a threatened
United States oil embargo.' 9'
In an effort to protect its oil investment from internal threats, the
Nigerian government has entered into security agreements with the
oil companies.' 92 Under these agreements, the government trains and
recruits a supernumerary police force' 93 specifically for the protection
of oil equipment and holdings. 94 The companies pay for this service,
compensating the force substantially better than compensation re-
ceived by State-sponsored police forces.'95
capital markets to make up for the government's shortfall.) In 1998, the amount
allocated to international oil companies by the government was $1 billion below
the amount requested. See id.
188. See id. (stating that the government's actions have exacerbated the compa-
nies' usual efforts in vying for political goodwill).
189. See id. (reporting that oil companies believe it is important to be seen in a
favorable light to key players in the military government). Efforts have included
attempts by Chevron and Mobil in lobbying the United States government to fight
off international sanctions. See id. at 31-32. Elf drilled an offshore oil site in an at-
tempt to show it sided with Nigeria on territorial and mineral resource disputes.
See id. at 32.
190. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 28-29 (detailing the relative interest the gov-
ernment has in each oil company).
191. See id. (reporting Mobil lobbied the U.S. government when it threatened an
oil embargo).
192. See id. at 115-122 (detailing the security arrangements used by Shell and
Chevron based on written correspondence with each company).
193. See id. at 115-116 (discussing the roles and functions of the police force in
protecting oil company property). The supernumerary police are also known as
"spy police," and may be dressed in plainclothes while conducting investigations.
See id.
194. See Police Act, Decree No. 41, sec.14(l), 87 OFFICIAL GAZETTE A 189
(Supp. 1967) (Nig.) (1967) (providing for the appointment of supernumerary po-
lice at the request of "any person who desires to avail himself of the services of
one or more officers for the protection of property owned or controlled by him").
195. See id. (making the employer responsible for uniform costs and compensa-
tion). Whether these forces are armed remains a dispute between the companies
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As the largest industry in the country,'"' the government cannot af-
ford to neglect its oil investment. '7 Statements released by the police
in one State, for example, warned that "the command will deal ruth-
lessly with anyone caught" in connection with sabotage operations. J"
Emphasizing the government's relationship with its joint venture
partners, former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Dan Etete,
stressed that any destruction of oil company property was identical to
destroying government property.'" Similarly, a Nigerian Navy Lieu-
tenant stated that the Navy would deal with anyone involved in at-
tacks on offshore oil rigs as an "economic saboteur" who would be
"decisively dealt with."2°°
B. THE OGONI AFFAIR
In 1993, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
("MOSOP") 20' organized protests that ultimately led to a decision by
and the local people who claim that most guards are armed. See MANBY, supra
note 8, at 115-117 (noting observations that supernumerary police are equipped
with weapons). In 1996, newspapers reported Shell was in negotiations to import
weapons for supernumerary police use. See generally A Call to End the Shelling o]
Nigeria, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL
13094245.
196. See International Monetary Fund, Nigeria: Selected Issues and Statistical
Appendix, supra note 17, at 6-11 (analyzing the importance of oil to the Nigerian
government). Nigeria is the fifth largest producer of oil in OPEC. See Manby, su-
pra note 8, at 6.
197. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 28-30 (discussing the government's interest in
six joint venture operations with multinational oil companies).
198. See id. at 121 (reiterating the state's commitment to deal forcefully with
threats to the oil industry).
199. See id. (echoing the national policy of dealing with those involved in sabo-
tage activities).
200. See id. (stating the military's stance on the oil production sabotage). The
people in the region, however, have not been deterred, and have increased the se-
verity and frequency of attacks on oil installations. See Energy-Nigeria-Texaco-
Lagos, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 1999 (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/990920/ep.html>.
201. See MOSOP Urges Caution Over "Democratic Progress", supra note 3
(describing the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People ("MOSOP") as a
Nigerian human and environmental rights group serving the needs of the Ogoni
people).
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Shell Oil Company to stop its oil production activities in the area.2"2
The movement began in 1990 when the MOSOP wrote an Ogoni Bill
of Rights2 3 making several political demands on the government. 0',
In January 1993, the MOSOP held a rally to mark the beginning of
the United Nation's International Year of the World's Indigenous
Peoples.05 Protests continued throughout the year,206 and by mid-
year, Shell decided to cease all production activities in Ogoni terri-
tory.0 7 Since then, threats to the oil industry have been commonplace
as other groups tried to duplicate the MOSOP's success.!
C. THE KAIAMA DECLARATION
Following the Ogoni example, youth groups of the Niger Delta or-
ganized in an attempt to assert their rights and to express frustration
202. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 124-129 (discussing the Ogoni Crisis). In
1990, the Ogoni ethnic group adopted the "Ogoni Bill of Rights" that listed the
Ogoni's complaints and demanded greater political autonomy and the creation of a
separate Ogoni State. See id. at 124. The protests in 1993 coincided with the
United Nation's International Year of the Indigenous Peoples and involved more
than half of the total Ogoni population. See id.
203. See Ogoni Bill of Rights (Nig. 1990), reprinted in KEN SARO-WIWA, A
MONTH AND A DAY: A DETENTION DIARY at 67-70 (1995).
204. See id. (noting specifically the right to representation in the national gov-
ernment, the right to control the affairs of the Ogoni people and freedom of relig-
ion).
205. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 124 (noting that several hundred thousand
people-at least half of the Ogoni population-participated in the rally).
206. See id. at 124-129 (detailing these protests and the government's response).
Several leaders of the MOSOP, including well-known author Ken Saro-Wiwa were
sentenced to death by extra-judicial bodies as a result of their role in the protests.
See id. Shell received international criticism for its perceived role in the execu-
tions. See id. at 12-13.
207. See id. at 124 (noting that Shell abandoned its operations due to intimida-
tion felt among its employees).
208. See id. at 129-131 (detailing attempts by other ethnic groups in the Delta to
replicate the MOSOP success). The Movement for the Survival of the Izon Ethnic
Nationality in the Niger Delta ("MOSIEND"), the Movement for the Reparation to
Ogbia ("MORETO"), and the Ijaw Youths have all presented declarations of rights
and grievances to the government. See id. at 129-130. The Chikoko Movement was
founded in 1997 to unite different ethnic groups in the region for the defense of
rights against common oppressors, including the Nigerian government. See id. at
130.
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at hostile government attitudes.09 Recently, this culminated in the
Kaiama Declaration ("Declaration"). '0 The Declaration expressed
the Ijaw tribe's frustration with government crackdowns,2'" environ-
mental destruction,2 2 and insufficient corporate initiatives to assist
the region.21 ' The Declaration took effect December 30, 1998.2" In
many ways, the Declaration reflected a militant attitude toward the
Nigerian government, the military, and oil companies. 1" The Decla-
ration called for ending conflicts with neighboring tribes and offered
mutual assistance in the struggle for self-determination.Ib
The Declaration reclaimed all land and minerals within the Ijaw
territory, demanded the withdrawal of the military in the region, "
and declared as enemies all oil companies that employed the Nige-
209. See The Kaiaia Declaration, supra note 32, at Ir 4 (expressing frustration
at being labeled saboteurs and terrorists); see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
NIGERIA: CRACKDOWN IN THE NIGER DELTA at 4 (1999) (discussing the social and
economic conditions that precipitated the Declaration).
210. The Kaiana Declaration, supra note 32.
211. See, e.g., iinfra notes 223-33 and accompanying text (discussing the gov-
ernment's response to the Kaiama Declaration).
212. See generally MANBY, supra note 8, at 53-87 (detailing the environmental
impact of oil production on the Niger Delta).
213. See id. at 95-96 (discussing the dire living conditions that persist in oil pro-
ducing areas, despite the Niger Delta region's vast wealth).
214. See The Kaiania Declaration, supra note 32, at ' d (observing that the
quality of life of the Ijaws is deteriorating as a result of neglect, suppression, and
marginalization due to the actions of the government and multinational oil compa-
nies). The Declaration also recognized that the crisis in Nigeria is a result of the
struggle for oil resources and that despite large revenue contributions from the Ni-
ger Delta, the Ijaws experienced ecological devastation and military repression.
See id.
215. See id. at Introduction (reinforcing the collective spirit of the Kaiama Dec-
laration).
216. See id. at 5-7 (expressing solidarity with all organizations and ethnicities
in Nigeria who are struggling for self-determination and justice, and affirming the
Ijaw commitment to a joint struggle with all the people in the Niger Delta). The
Kaiama Declaration also expressed the hope that Nigerian oil workers would "see
this struggle for freedom as a struggle for humanity." Id. at 7.
217. See id. at 1 (claiming that oil resources are the basis of Ijaw survival and
explaining that the land and natural resources belong to the Ijaw people).
218. See id. at 3 (urging family members of military personnel stationed in the
region to appeal to their relatives to leave the ljaw territory alone).
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rian armed services."'9 It also revoked recognition of all undemocratic
decrees that served to revoke the Ijaw's right to own and control land
resources and affairs."O Ijaw clans further threatened to reclaim con-
trol of their lives on the day the Declaration took effect."' The Decla-
ration then advised all oil companies and staff operating within Ijaw
territory to withdraw until resource ownership and allocation issues
were resolved.2
The government's response to the Kaiama Declaration was char-
acteristically brutal.2  On December 30, 1998, members of the Ijaw
clans and other tribes in the Delta region gathered in several cities for
peaceful marches. 24 Protesters in most communities were unarmed." '
In the city of Yenagoa, 6 the march proceeded peacefully until pro-
227testors approached the base of a military administrator. Once at the
219. See id. (singling out as enemies of the Ijaw people oil companies who em-
ploy the military to protect their operations).
220. The Kaiama Declaration, supra note 32, at 1 (citing specifically the Land
Use Decree and the Petroleum Decree as examples).
221. See id. at 4 (advising all oil company employees and contractors to with-
draw by December 30, 1998).
222. See id. (proposing that oil companies make a temporary withdraw from the
area). In response to the Kaiama Declaration, Chevron evacuated most of its em-
ployees from the region. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NIGERIA: CRACKDOWN IN
THE NIGER DELTA, supra note 209, at 15 (1999).
223. See Cutfew Imposed on Troubled Nigerian State, AFRICA NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21358835 (reporting that the government de-
clared a state of emergency in response to the Kaiama Declaration). The emer-
gency ceased on January 5, 1999. See Curfew Lifted in Nigeria "s Troubled Region,
supra note 27; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 209, at 6 (reporting
that soldiers arrived in the Delta in several truckloads and boasted of their intent to
attack those who wanted to stop the oil companies).
224. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 209, at 6 (stating that several thou-
sand youths gathered in Yenagoa, Bomadi, Olibiri, and other communities to sup-
port the Kaiama Declaration and to take part in a traditional dance).
225. See id. (reporting eyewitness accounts of unarmed protestors). The Ijaw
Youth Council sent letters to all communities in the Delta instructing the youths
not to carry weapons or drink alcohol before the demonstrations. See id.
226. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 94 (stating that Yenagoa is the capital of
Bayelsa State, but comprises little more than a crossroads, bus terminal and land-
ing stage).
227. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 209, at 6 (stating that the proces-
sion peacefully passed the local police station and that violence did not ensue until
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base, military personnel attacked the crowd and a riot ensued,-" re-
sulting in the injury of many protestors and the death of two military
personnel
29
Several days later, the military attacked two Ijaw villages using
Chevron-owned helicopters and boats. -'0 Witnesses reported that they
were accustomed to seeing Chevron helicopters in the area and ex-
pressed surprised when operators began firing.!" Following the aerial
attack, the military entered both villages in boats and burned each to
the ground. 2 Chevron refused to condemn the action, claiming that
as a result of the joint venture relationship, it had no control over
military demands to use its modes of transport.:"
marchers approached the State House). Protestors also faced military violence in
Mbiama, resulting in the death of at least ten youths. See id. at 7.
228. See id. (reporting that soldiers fired on the demonstrators using tear gas,
rifles and machine guns). The local police commissioner later stated that security
personnel acted in self-defense when 500 youths forced their way through the gate.
See id. Participants, however, claimed that soldiers began firing when they were
some distance away. See id.
229. See id. (stating that rumors indicated some soldiers were disarmed, but this
could not be confirmed by any eyewitnesses). One of the injured individuals
claimed that he was shot in the chest during the confrontation. See id. When he re-
gained consciousness, he tried to find a place to hide, but only succeeded in getting
the soldier's attention. See id. They then shot him in the leg at point blank range,
dragged him across the road, and continued to beat and kick him in the head. See
id. He regained consciousness in the hospital mortuary. See id. Terrified, he began
to scream, which attracted a soldier, who made another attempt on his life, but was
forestalled by nurses. See id. His leg was amputated several days later. See id.
230. See id. at 13-19 (discussing in detail the military attacks on Opia and Iken-
yan beginning in early January, 1999).
231. See id. at 14 (reporting that local villagers thought nothing of seeing Chev-
ron helicopters in the area until they fired shots).
232. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 209 at 6 (claiming soldiers fired
indiscriminately, torched villages and destroyed other property). The leader of
Ikenyan was killed as he approached the waterside in an attempt to negotiate with
the soldiers. See id.
233. See Chevron's Nigeria Conimient (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http://www.chevron.com/newsusindex.html> (stating that Chevron does not own
helicopters or boats, but that the Joint Venture leases boats and helicopters and as a
majority partner, the government may make use of the leased equipment when it
deems necessary). See also MANBY, supra note 8, at 28-29 (discussing the par-
ticulars of the Joint Venture relationship among the oil companies and the Nigerian
government).
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IV. APPLICATION OF COMMON INTERPRETIVE
PRINCIPLES TO NIGERIA
The Nigerian government's actions violate its obligations under
214the ICCPR. In its last report, the HRC expressed concern over ac-
tions taken by the military regime.235 Many of these actions, however,
are permissible if a public emergency exists in the Delta.236 Due to
the HRC's failure to clearly define the circumstances in which dero-
gation measures are appropriate, it is difficult to determine with cer-
tainty whether invoking Article IV is appropriate.237 Applying the
common criteria of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights, the Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards, it
becomes clear that such measures are not legally justified."
A. EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCE THAT IS ACTUAL OR IMMINENT
Public emergencies that threaten the life of a nation must be a sig-
nificant disruption rather than a low-level civil disturbance. " The
current protests in the Delta, however, fall into the latter category.240
Although the people in the region protested regularly throughout the
234. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 40, U.N. Doe. A/51/40 (1996) (discussing the comments of the HRC in re-
sponse to the last State report submitted by the Nigerian government).
235. See id. at 270 (expressing concern over Nigeria's compliance with its ob-
ligations to guarantee the right to life, freedom from torture and cruelty, liberty and
security, and equality before the courts).
236. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 174 (prohibiting derogation from guarantee-
ing the right to life and freedom from torture and cruelty). Derogations from liberty
and equality before the law, however, are permissible. See id.
237. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the
HRC to establish the criteria for a legal derogation under Article IV).
238. See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text (applying each of these cri-
teria and arguing that the Nigerian government is not legally justified to invoke
Article IV measures).
239. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Einer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 16 (noting that the plain language of the public emer-
gency exception requires more than a civil disturbance common to most democra-
cies).
240. See infra notes 241-50 and accompanying text (supporting this conclusion
by examining the current political situation in Nigeria).
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last decade,2' the largest loss of life from these protests resulted from
a clash between demonstrators and police in 1990.2'2 The subsequent
protests, designed to duplicate the success of the Ogonis,z" were
largely unsuccessful.2" Acts of sabotage and kidnappings perpetuated
against oil companies simply resulted in temporary or negligible ef-
fects on oil production.2 4' Additionally, activities that have a destruc-
tive impact on the environment continue to remain unaddressed.2"
Oil revenues, however, continue to reach the billion-dollar mark,
and plans by each oil company to increase oil production continue.!"
Research and development projects aimed at the extraction of natural
gas deposits are underway2" and President Obasanjo recently ap-
241. See generally MANBY, supra note 8, at 123-131 (discussing the history of
protest and repression in the Niger Delta).
242. See id. at 123 (discussing the events that occurred in Umuechem, which re-
sulted in the death of 80 unarmed demonstrators and the destruction of 495
homes). This was the first incident that brought international attention to the situa-
tion in the Delta. See id. Protestors demanded electricity and water supplies, roads,
and compensation for crop losses that occurred as a result of oil pollution. See id.
When Shell learned of the upcoming protest, it wrote to the Nigerian State police
commissioner of an "impending attack" on its facilities and requested assistance
from the paramilitary police force. See id.
243. See supra notes 201-07 (discussing the successes of the MOSOP).
244. See generally supra notes 209-33 and accompanying text (using the
Kaiama Declaration as an example of a failed attempt at prolonged oil disruption).
245. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Deep in the Republic of Chevron (visited Sept.
21, 1999) <http://archives.nytimes.com/archivesIsearch> (describing a typical
hostage situation in which a group of protestors forced officials to stop oil produc-
tion at one site). That incident resulted in the loss of a few thousand barrels of oil.
See id. The superintendent of oil production characterized the incident as "not a big
deal." See id.
246. See Anver Versi, Another Biafra in the Making?, AFRICA NEWS SERV., Oct.
1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11783928 (describing a state of near anarchy in the
Delta region). Massive gas flaring in some areas caused acid rain and contamina-
tion of the drinking water sources. See id. But see Goddy Ikeh, Nigeria Turns on
Oil Giants Over Saro-Wiwa Death, INDEPENDENT at 19 (Oct. 26, 1999) (reporting
the Nigerian government gave multinational oil companies six weeks to develop an
environmental clean-up plan for the Delta region).
247. See generally MANBY, supra note 8, at 28-29 (discussing plans by the joint
venture partners to increase oil production).
248. See, e.g., Shell Planning to Develop Nigerian Oil Field, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Oct. 31, 1999, at 9 (reporting that Shell planned on spending an addi-
tional S1.8 billion to expand capacity at its Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas plant).
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proved the construction of a $400 million natural gas pipeline
through the region. 249 The military sought to prevent disruptions to oil
production and industrial development rather than respond to actual
or imminent harm posed by protest activities.25 Because the protests
were carried out over a prolonged period and the military's response
to the protests was preventative rather than responsive to an actual
or imminent threat, the Nigerian government would fail the immi-
252
nence prong.
B. THREAT TO THE ORGANIZED LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY
To threaten the organized life of the community, the public emer-
gency must jeopardize the normal functioning of government institu-
tions.2 " A state of emergency declared to protect the Nigerian gov-
ernment's power, therefore, fails to establish a threat to the organized
life of the community.5 Governments faced with regional conflict,
should necessarily consider the impact on central government insti-
tutions."' Protests in the Delta, however, have not posed such a threat
to the Nigerian community at large.2 " The Kaiama Declaration, ' the
249. See Nigeria President Dismisses Criticism of Pipeline Project, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Sept. 24, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL DJINSPLUS
(statement of President Obasanjo) (approving the pipeline construction based on
the belief that pumping natural gas for use in other countries is more useful that
allowing gas flares).
250. See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text (supporting the conclusion
that the military's activities were purely preventative).
251. See Hartman, Working Paper, supra note 162, at 91 (characterizing pro-
longed measures to perceived threats as one of the most severe examples of a State
abusing the states of emergency declaration).
252. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46 (establishing imminence as a necessary requirement for de-
claring a state of emergency).
253. See id. at 91 (emphasizing that an emergency must imperil a nation's abil-
ity to operate a polity before that nation acts to suspend fundamental rights).
254. See O'Donnell, supra note 122, at 24 (providing examples of permissible
and impermissible derogations).
255. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, supra note 46, at 92 (noting that regional conflicts may justify derogation
measures if they impair national institutions).
256. See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text (analyzing the level of threat
required to declare a state of emergency and reasoning that Nigeria has not satis-
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Ogoni Bill of Rights,2" and similar documents2" have all expressed a
willingness and desire that the Niger Delta remain a part of the Nige-
rian State. Although confrontations often occur at or near military
establishments,2'6 protestors have not specifically targeted govern-
ment institutions. 26' The military presence and security in the region
has remained despite continued protests.2 2
An attempt to invoke Article IV would reflect the Nigerian gov-
ernment's concern in protecting its own authority rather than secur-
ing the rights of its people.263 The indigenous people seek enforce-
ment of their rights guaranteed under the ICCPR.2: They aspire to
exercise the right to self-determination2 : by increasing their repre-
sentation in the government.2' Foregoing heightened government
participation secures only a future all too familiar to the Delta indi-
genes; a future of struggling to pursue economic and cultural devel-
fled this requirement).
257. See The Kaianma Declaration, supra note 32, at r 10 (expressing a willing-
ness to remain part of the Nigerian State).
258. See Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 203 (demanding greater political
autonomy and listing the ways it could be achieved). The Ogoni Bill of Rights
sought to draw attention to the plight of the Ogoni people and presented a series of
demands to the government. See id.
259. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 129-31 (discussing attempts by other commu-
nities in the oil-producing region to reproduce the success of the MOSOP).
260. See, e.g., supra notes 223-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Nige-
rian government's response to the Kaiama Declaration).
261. See, e.g., supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text (discussing marches
held in support of the Kaiama Declaration).
262. See Duodu, Confounding the Prophets of Doon, supra note 175 (charac-
terizing the government's use of the military in response to threats to oil produc-
tion a "knee jerk reaction").
263. See infra notes 264-68 (analyzing the conclusion that the government's su-
perceding concern in calling a state of emergency was its own preservation).
264. See infra notes 265-67 (discussing indigenous individuals' efforts to secure
rights guaranteed by the ICCPR).
265. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 173 (declaring the right to self-determination
for all peoples).
266. See The Kaianza Declaration, supra note 32, at C 10 (expressing the Ijaw
commitment to remain within Nigeria, but committing to work for self-
government); see generally supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text (discussing
the Ogoni Bill of Rights).
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opment.16 Addressing such concerns would serve to strengthen the
current fragile Nigerian democracy rather than threaten it. 2 8 In light
of this analysis, the Nigerian government's enactment of derogation
measures would be unjustifiable.
C. THREAT TO THE ENTIRE POPULATION
Public emergencies must effect the entire population of the coun-
try or, if the emergency is confined to a particular region, the entire
population of the effected region.2 ° Thus, a government must distin-
guish between public emergencies isolated in effect and those that
have the capacity to, or do in fact, effect a population at large.
2 71
An emergency resulting from a disruption in oil production would
have virtually no adverse effect on a substantial portion of the popu-
lation in the Delta.272 Oil companies have maintained a policy of not
employing indigenous people.273 Moreover, because the government
267. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 173 (stating that because all people have the
right to self-determination, they have the right to pursue economic, social and cul-
tural development); see also Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 203, at 69 (claiming
that government policies are threatening Ogoni culture and demanding a larger
share of the oil wealth derived from Ogoni territory); THE KAIAMA DECLARATION,
supra note 32, at 2 (ceasing to recognize undemocratic decrees that revoke own-
ership and control of Ijaw lives and resources).
268. See James Rupert, Unrest Threatens Plans of Nigeria's New Leader,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1999, at A15 (reporting that daily unrest in the Delta threat-
ens President Obasanjo's efforts to establish peace and stability in the country).
269. See supra notes 253-68 (analyzing the criteria and supporting the conclu-
sion that derogation measures employed by the Nigerian government would be
unjustified).
270. See Paris Minimum Standards, supra note 31, at 1073 (establishing the re-
quirement that a public emergency must affect a "whole population" or "the whole
population of an area").
271. See The Lawless Case, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 2 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.)(Commission report) (defining a public emergency in its natural and ordinary
meaning).
272. See infra notes 273-79 (providing support for the conclusion that the Delta
population would not feel the effects of a disruption to oil production).
273. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 101-102 (reporting that multinational oil
companies do not employ indigenous people because they do not have the neces-
sary expertise). But see Versi, supra note 246 (reporting that President Obasanjo
proposed creating a job training program for the region to prepare the people for
job opportunities in the oil and gas sector).
[15:1 1631202
IS THERE A PUBLIC EMERGENCY IN NIGERI .?
works in conjunction with multinational corporations, the people re-
ceive few benefits from oil production in the region.2 74 The benefits
that are received, however, go into the hands of a select few.2" Fur-
thermore, voluntary corporate initiatives, such as hospital construc-
tion, are limited and often of little value,2'6 making their loss rela-
tively inconsequential. 2" The people would, therefore, lose few
benefits from a disruption in oil production.2" Since the Nigerian
people would experience no adversity from a disruption in oil pro-
duction, the "entirety" test would fail as a legitimate argument es-
pousing the invocation of derogation measures.2 "
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Nigeria is not the only country facing internal strife. :' ' Currently,
several states have formally invoked the Article IV exception.2" Be-
cause any signatory to the ICCPR could face a public emergency, the
HRC should implement a framework for determining whether dero-
gation measures are appropriate.m This framework should include a
system of monitoring such measures that reflects the HRC's recog-
274. See U.S. Leaders Write Albright on Nigeria, supra note 7 (stating that the
government accumulated billions from the region and contributed little in return).
275. See MANBY, supra note 8, at 105 (reporting that much of the money spent
on development goes to local contractors or chiefs or to pay off troublemakers).
276. See generally id. at 104 (noting hospitals built by oil companies do not
have water or electricity). Chevron, under pressure to build a road through a wet
area, did so, knowing it would eventually collapse. See, e.g., Onishi, supra note
245 (noting Chevron's carelessness).
277. See supra notes 273-77 (arguing that oil production has provided few bene-
fits to the local people, making disruptions in oil production inconsequential).
278. See id. (analyzing the reasons for the conclusion that disruption in oil pro-
duction would have an adverse effect on the people).
279. See Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 203, at 67-70 (establishing threats to
the entire population as a necessary requirement for a state of emergency).
280. See ICCPR website, supra note 18 (noting many countries, including Ar-
gentina, Chile, Columbia, Israel, Russia, Sudan, and Great Britain have invoked
Article IV).
281. See id. (listing the signatories to the ICCPR, their reservations, and in-
stances of derogation).
282. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (noting the HRC has not
provided a framework for determining when the use of derogations measures is
appropriate).
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nition that human rights deserve special protection when a State is
283
confronted with a public emergency.
A. DEVELOP A COMMON CRITERIA FOR INVOKING ARTICLE IV
MEASURES
The HRC should formally adopt the following criteria for deter-
mining whether a public emergency exists: (1) the emergency must
be actual or imminent; (2) it must threaten the organized life of the
community; and (3) the emergency must effect the entire population
of the community or the entire population of the region to which the
derogating measures apply.28 4 This conception of a public emergency
reflects the work of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights and the work of legal scholars with expertise in this area."'
Adoption of these criteria can occur in one of two ways.8 6 The
most effective method, however, is for the Committee to issue a gen-
eral comment under its Article XL(3) authority.287 The comment
should mandate that countries wishing to invoke Article IV establish
each of these criteria prior to the invocation of derogation meas-
ures.2 88 The HRC should use the work of the European Convention's
bodies, the Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards to
283. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., An-
nex VII, General Comments 5/13, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (reporting the
Committee's view that invocation of Article IV measures increases the importance
of human rights protections).
284. See supra notes 122-24, 159, 169 and accompanying text (noting that these
criteria are rooted in the interpretation of at least three different bodies that have
attempted the determination of what constitutes a public emergency).
285. See id.
286. See infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing a method of adoption
using general comments issued by the HRC). Alternatively, the HRC could adopt
these measures by consistently asking State representatives to apply each of the
criteria in their presentation to the Committee. See supra notes 64-71 (describing
the State reporting process).
287. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 181 (authorizing the HRC to issue general
comments to State parties); see also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text
(noting the HRC has increasingly used general comments to interpret provisions of
the ICCPR).
288. See supra notes 122-24, 159, 169 and accompanying text (noting the origin
and common roots of these criteria).
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assist in establishing the authority of the criteria.2 In applying each
of the criteria, a margin of appreciation should be granted to a State's
determination of the existence of a public emergency!" While this
margin should be persuasive, it should not be determinative.!
B. SHORTEN THE PERIODICITY REQUIREMENT
Article IV(3) requires States invoking the derogation provision to
inform other State parties of the derogation, the provisions to which
the derogation apply, and the reasons for the derogation.': The HRC
subsequently adopted a measure requiring States to indicate the na-
ture and extent of the rights from which it has derogated."'3 Under
present HRC guidelines, however, this is the only report the Com-
mittee receives until the State submits its next periodic report, up to
five years later. 294
To avoid this possibility, the HRC should impose a shortened pe-
riodicity requirement on States invoking derogation measures.-" This
shortened period would allow the HRC to continuously monitor both
the measures taken by derogating States and the number of citizens
289. See wa Mutua, supra note 67, at 231 (asserting that the HRC could improve
general comments made by increasing the number of substantial arguments it uses
to interpret provisions contained in the Covenant and suggesting references to
authorities in the human rights field).
290. See supra notes 110, 135, 161 and accompanying text (discussing the mar-
gin of appreciation doctrine and the level of appreciation afforded to a govern-
ment's determination of a state of emergency under the European Convention and
the Siracusa Principles).
291. See id. (representing a compromise between two differing levels of appre-
ciation granted to governments).
292. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Article IV(3)
requirement in greater detail).
293. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (expressing the Committee's
view that the reporting requirement contained in Article IV(3) is important, and
that it is equally important for parties to include the nature and extent of each nght
from which it has derogated).
294. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR. 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex V, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (adopting a periodicity
rule requiring States to submit a report once every five years after submission and
consideration of its initial report).
295. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at 181 (imposing an obligation on parties to the
Covenant to submit a State report whenever the Committee requests).
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effected to ensure government officials employ only those measures
that are strictly necessary by the circumstances of the emergency."'
Shortening the periodicity requirement also allows the Committee to
question State representatives and recommend government action so
as to limit government infringement of ICCPR provisions. "7 In-
creased dialogue with derogating States would reflect the Commit-
tee's special concern for individual rights when States are faced with
298a public emergency.
C. REPEAL THE BILL CREATING THE NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION
In July 1999, President Obasanjo presented a bill to the Senate and
National House of Assembly for the creation of the Niger Delta De-
velopment Commission ("NDDC").2" The purpose of the Commis-
sion was to accelerate development in the Delta and compensate for
previous neglect and environmental degradation.3°° Under Obasanjo's
plan, the NDDC is responsible for formulating policies and guide-
lines for development, implementing development projects, and as-
sessing projects carried out under the auspices of the NDDC. T '
Funding for the NDDC was to come from government oil revenues
and from a tax on oil companies. 0 2 After several changes by the Sen-
ate and National Assembly, the bill was passed on January 20,
296. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 84-85 (noting that the Committee imposed a
requirement on States to report the nature and extent of the measures it has utilized
while under a public emergency).
297. See id. (reporting Committee members often question State representa-
tives).
298. See HENKIN, supra note 34 (discussing the HRC's particular interest in
protecting human rights during a state of emergency).
299. See Obasanjo Proposes New Body to Develop Troubled Niger Delta,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2637609 (reporting
that President Obasanjo presented a bill to the House of Representatives proposing
the creation of a Niger Delta Development Commission to oversee development in
the oil producing regions).
300. See Ono Ibien, Rethinking the Niger Delta Commission (visited Feb. 10,
2000) <http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/editorial/en763801.htm> (reporting on
the overall objectives of the Niger Delta Development Commission).
301. See id. (delineating the responsibilities of the NDDC).
302. See id. (detailing the funding sources for the NDDC).
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2000.03 Despite its intended purposes, however, the bill should be
repealed. °M
Fundamental weaknesses in the bill initially led officials from
every State in the Delta to unanimously oppose the creation of the
NDDC. °5 Officials primarily criticized the bill for not addressing re-
source allocation issues.3° The bill does not require the NDDC to lo-
cate its programs and projects in proportion to the amount of funding
received from each State.307 There is further concern the NDDC lacks
appropriate oversight."8 The NNDC is responsible for allocating
large amounts of financial resources, but there is no provision for
feedback from the proposed beneficiaries of the NDDC's projects.""
Because of these flaws, the bill establishing the NDDC should be
repealed and resources should be given directly to each State in pro-
portion to the mineral revenue derived from that State.""0 This system
would allow States to address their individual needs without gov-
ernment oversight or interference. States would also not have to
303. See Nigeria Passes Niger Delta Development Commission Bill, Dow Jones
Energy Serv., Jan. 20, 2000 (reporting that the National Assembly passed the bill,
allowing the government to address the problems in the Delta).
304. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for
repealing the bill).
305. See Okafor Ofiebor, Niger Delta Development Commission: Oil States
Move Against Obasanyo, AFRICAN NEWs SERV., Aug. 2, 1999, available in 1999
WL 22789083 (reporting the oil producing States unanimously rejected the pro-
posed Commission); see also Anthony Okoro, Youth Condemn Commission,
AFRICA NEWs SERV., Aug, 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25943239 (reporting
the Niger-Delta Youths heavily criticized the bill).
306. See Ibien, supra note 300 (criticizing the bill for not providing constitution-
ally mandated resources and for failing to tax offshore oil and gas production op-
erations).
307. See Ibien, supra note 300 (criticizing the bill for only requiring the NDDC
to consider the contributions of each state, but not providing enough protection for
proportionality).
308. See id. (expressing the fear of mismanagement and the lack of government
oversight to prevent it).
309. See id. (noting the beneficiaries of the NDDC were not consulted in the
draffing process and that there are no built-in provisions for feedback from natives
of the Delta).
310. See infra notes 314-16 and accompanying text (suggesting a replacement
for the bill).
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compete with one another for limited resources."' This system is
consistent with the desire for self-determination expressed in the
Kaiama Declaration and declarations of other organizations."2
Granting resource control to those who have suffered most from
systematic government neglect would allow the people of the Delta
an opportunity to decide for themselves the conditions in which they
live.3 ' Under these conditions, there is a decreased need to forcefully
assert these rights and a corresponding decrease in the need for re-




As the situation in the Niger Delta illustrates, determining whether
internal unrest constitutes a public emergency and whether excep-
tional measures are necessary is problematic. Because of this diffi-
culty, government leaders may be prone to resorting to measures that
violate the ICCPR's guarantees even when they are not clearly war-
ranted by the circumstances. To ease this burden, the Human Rights
Committee should formally adopt a set of guidelines which justify
invoking the Article IV derogation provision. The criteria developed
by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the
Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards are easily ap-
plicable to a large variety of situations in which a State may find it-
self. Their common criteria should, therefore, be applied. These cri-
teria, coupled with increased monitoring throughout a state of
emergency, would ensure countries are able both to respond mean-
311. See Ibien, supra note 301 (criticizing the Niger Delta Development Com-
mission for not providing for proportional revenue allocation); see also Kenneth
Tadaferua, Niger Delta: Let Equality Rule, AFRICA NEWS SERV., May 12, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 20072646 (predicting that the rancor that will be created
from sharing funds among the oil-producing states will lead to a massive crisis that
will be both bloody and destructive).
312. See id. (noting resource control was part of the demand for self-
determination).
313. See generally supra notes 201-33 and accompanying text (describing ef-
forts by natives of the Delta to assert their rights and the corresponding military
response).
314. See id. (providing for conditions in which protest and repression are not
necessary).
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ingfully to public emergencies and to honor their obligations under
the ICCPR.
